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Putting the First Amendment in Its Place:
Enhancing American Democracy through
the Press
Robert M. Entmant
Achieving a "system of free expression," as that term is con-
ventionally understood, will not produce healthy democracy. In
fact, we have already very nearly attained such a system, insofar as
one can be molded and promoted under the regime of the First
Amendment. The constraints on the news media that are due to
legal action or government regulation are now generally minor. Yet
this forbearance has not yielded news media that consistently meet
the standards that Professor Sunstein suggests: a sufficient amount
of attention to public issues and the expression of diverse views on
these issues.1 If we continue to constrain our discussion within
traditional First Amendment parameters, it is difficult to imagine
communications law and policy doing much to improve matters.
By the standards of the Hutchins Commission Report,2 de-
mocracy and the press have made little progress since 1947. The
Hutchins Commission's description of the press reads much as it
would if written today:
The news is twisted by the emphasis on firstness, on the
novel and sensational; by the personal interests of own-
ers; and by pressure groups. Too much of the regular out-
put of the press consists of a miscellaneous succession of
stories and images which have no relation to the typical
lives of real people anywhere. Too often the result is
meaninglessness, flatness, distortion, and the perpetua-
tion of misunderstanding among widely scattered groups
whose only contact is through these media.'
t Associate Professor of Communication Studies, Journalism, and Political Science,
and Faculty Fellow, Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern Univer-
sity; A.B., Duke University; Ph.D. (Political Science), Yale University.
Cass R. Sunstein, Half-Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U Chi Legal F 25, 33.
See also Lee C. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
' Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (University of
Chicago Press, 1947) ("Hutchins Report").
3 Id at 68.
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Exactly how accurate this indictment is today can be debated,
but the literature supporting similar charges against the current
media is voluminous.' Many observers consider today's highly
competitive media scene a marked improvement over the past, and
we have recently seen a significant augmentation in television news
outlets with the introduction of CNN and C-SPAN. But research
suggests these news sources have had little impact on the demo-
cratic process because relatively few Americans consistently watch
such programs." Even assuming the quality of the press has im-
proved, it continues to fall short in terms of at least two important
measures of the impact that journalism could have on democracy.
First, controlling for the increase in education, the American pub-
lic appears less informed now than in the late 1940s." That is, col-
lege graduates today are less politically aware than college gradu-
ates in the late 1940s. Second, Americans now vote less religiously
than they used to. Despite some scholarship to the contrary, 8 these
two indices suggest that the American media are not enhancing the
democratic process as the Hutchins Commission hoped they
would."
In addition, leaving aside the quality of public input, and as-
sessing instead the quality of government's policy outputs, we
See Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy
(Oxford University Press, 1992); W. Lance Bennett, The Governing Crisis: Media, Money,
and Marketing in American Elections (St. Martin's Press, 1992); Robert M. Entman, De-
mocracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics (Oxford University
Press, 1989).
6 Entman, Democracy Without Citizens (cited in note 4).
O I shall use the term "press" to encompass both print and electronic news media.
See Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, Stability and Change in the U.S.
Public's Knowledge of Politics, 55 Pub Op Q 583, 607 (1991). Even without controlling for
educational changes, the American public actually appears less knowledgeable now. about
certain subjects. See W. Russell Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and
Opinion in the American Electorate (Harvard University Press, 1986).
8 An emerging literature in political science essentially argues that while the average
American voter is little interested and poorly informed, such an orientation to public affairs
may be rational. These scholars suggest voters do surprisingly well at matching their likes or
preferences to the candidates who fit best. See, for example, Samuel L. Popkin, The Rea-
soning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (University of
Chicago Press, 1991); Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, Reason-
ing and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Among the problems with this conclusion, however, is that it treats likes and preferences as
autonomously determined by each individual, and ignores those who do not vote at all.
9 It is possible that due to some unmeasured factors, the American public would have
been even less informed and less disposed to vote than they are now were it not for vast
improvements in the media's performance. That, however, seems much more speculative




might also find the government's responses and responsiveness to
major problems insufficient. 10 The reasons for these conditions are
complex and certainly cannot be traced to the media alone. Al-
though I focus my attention on the press in this article, I do not
fail to appreciate that other elements of society, including the pub-
lic education system, the political party system, campaign financ-
ing, and ideological or cultural biases, also contribute to the imper-
fections of American democracy.
Certainly a case can be made that American democracy is
healthy, with the American press a vigorous partner in the process.
Is the glass half empty or half full? Of course it is both. By the
criteria I weigh most heavily, however, especially the level of the
public's knowledgeable voting participation and the government's
accountability, honesty, and responsiveness on policy issues vital
to the quality and fairness of life in the United States, I judge the
emptiness most salient, and that judgment is the basis of my
analysis.
I will argue two basic propositions related to Professor Sun-
stein's four "half-truths":
(1) Despite the First Amendment, the government heavily in-
fluences or, in many cases, determines the information that most
Americans receive via the news media. The First Amendment does
not prevent government from shaping most important dimensions
of the news media's messages. This relationship is rooted in the
seemingly voluntary reliance of news organizations on public offi-
cials and agencies for most of the assumptions and information
that frame and suffuse the news." Although government policy
and law have relatively little direct impact on the information that
appears or does not appear in the news, government officials have
very much to do with media content.
In Professor Sunstein's terms, the government actively dis-
criminates in favor of some viewpoints, greatly controlling which
are publicly available. What I add to Professor Sunstein's discus-
sion of his first "half-truth"' 2 is that this occurs largely outside of
"0 See William Greider, Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democ-
racy (Simon & Schuster, 1992); Bennett, The Governing Crisis (cited in note 4).
" This relationship is not truly voluntary. It is encouraged and cemented by mutually
reinforcing commercial incentives, professional norms, and cultural values that make reli-
ance upon government elites the most rational practice for news organizations. See Herbert
J. Gans, Deciding What's News: A study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, News-
week, and Time (Pantheon Books, 1979); David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman, Media
Power Politics (Free Press, 1981).
2 Sunstein, 1993 U Chi Legal F at 26 (cited in note 1).
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any legal or regulatory compulsion as these are generally under-
stood. My point also amplifies Professor Sunstein's third half-
truth, that penalizing and subsidizing speech may be difficult to
distinguish in practice.13
(2) In recent years, the government's use of the First Amend-
ment in policy decisions toward the media has tended to neglect
the goals cited by the Hutchins Commission and others, like Pro-
fessor Sunstein. Instead, the First Amendment ironically has had a
chilling effect on public discourse about the legitimate tools and
ultimate ends of public policies toward the communications media.
Policymakers and judges should ask themselves how best to
achieve the Hutchins Commission's, or some other, democratic vi-
sion, rather than uphold an interpretation of the First Amendment
that ignores the government's informal influence over media con-
tent. These points elaborate on all four of Professor Sunstein's
half-truths, especially the problematic assumption that content-
based regulation is the gravest threat to media autonomy,14 and
that content neutrality is preferable or even attainable.1"
Analyzing the "free and responsible press" strictly in First
Amendment terms, while natural enough for a law school forum,
misses most of the forces that affect how well the press serves de-
mocracy in the United States. Taking account of larger social
forces and contexts would help connect First Amendment theory
more closely with the real-world production, distribution, and con-
sumption of news, and thus with the effects that the press has on
democracy. Professor Sunstein writes that we need a "thorough
empirical understanding of the free speech 'status quo,' and here
there is a distressingly large gap in the free speech literature.""
But in fact my disciplines of communication studies, journalism,
and political science offer an enormous literature-not couched in
terms of evaluating the abstract system of free speech, but empiri-
cally exploring and normatively evaluating how the news media ac-
tually influence the American democratic process.17
" Id at 39-40.
14 Id at 30.
" Id at 41.
16 Sunstein, 1993 U Chi Legal F at 33 (cited in note 1).
" See the works cited in notes 4, 7, and 8. See also Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and
American Politics (CQ Press, 4th ed 1993); Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political
Spectacle (University of Chicago Press, 1988); Daniel C. Hallin, The "Uncensored War":
The Media and Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 1986); Thomas E. Patterson, The Mass
Media Election: How Americans Choose Their President (Praeger Publishers, 1980).
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I am not saying it would be good to have government restric-
tions on press expression. Less still am I suggesting that govern-
ment's lack of formal control over the press is irrelevant to the
quality of American democracy. But this laudable constraint on
government's legal power over the media has tightened since 1964
and New York Times Co. v Sullivan"5 without noticeably enhanc-
ing democracy. To me, this indicates that conventional First
Amendment law and policy may offer few ways to improve the
press enough to revitalize the democratic process.
In this article, I first explore institutionalized viewpoint dis-
crimination by the government. Next, I examine the chilling effect
of the First Amendment on policy discourse. I conclude by offering
recommendations on how to reduce the government's informal
power to shape the news.
I. INSTITUTIONALIZED VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION BY THE
GOVERNMENT
Professor Sunstein describes his first half-truth as the notion
that the Constitution prohibits viewpoint discrimination.19 The law
says "government may not distort the deliberative process by eras-
ing one side of a debate. '20 Yet functionally, government does pre-
cisely this all of the time. Indeed, large staffs in the White House
and throughout the Executive Branch exist solely to dominate
public perceptions and debate, and empirical research shows that
they often succeed. 21 Moreover, if by "government" Professor Sun-
stein means the entire governmental apparatus, including the legis-
lative and judicial branches, then most of the time government er-
ases not just one, but most, of the potential sides of any debate.
The discourse among the elites who run the three branches of the
federal government frames the feasible diagnoses and options that
achieve wide distribution in the national media, and in this sense
'8 376 US 254 (1964). See Rodney A. Smolla, Suing the Press (Oxford University Press,
1986); Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (Ran-
dom House, 1991).
"' Sunstein, 1993 U Chi Legal F at 26 (cited in note 1).
20 Id at 27.
" See Michael B. Grossman and Martha J. Kumar, Portraying the President: The
White House and the News Media (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Mark Hert-
sgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (Farrar, Straus & Giroux,
1988); Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (CQ Press,
2d ed 1993); John A. Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications
and the Management of Presidential News (University of North Carolina Press, 1992);
Entman, Democracy Without Citizens (cited in note 4).
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government largely determines the viewpoints that reach public
consciousness. 22 If, despite the First Amendment, government can
exert such extensive control over the distribution of ideas, the
press will have a difficult time disseminating information that
helps the public hold that very same government accountable.
This informal regulatory relationship is different from and
preferable to formal regulatory prohibitions against publicizing
particular ideas. But to ignore the informal regulatory power is to
lose touch with the media system as it actually operates. Govern-
ment constantly engages in viewpoint discrimination, and such dis-
crimination is inherent in the First Amendment regime. That is,
the press is free to pass along the propaganda of the current ad-
ministration in Washington, with no obligation to give equal access
to the opposition party, let alone to views beyond the two parties'
discursive boundaries. If an opposition party disagrees with the ad-
ministration but fails to play the media spin game effectively, dis-
senting views may be hard to find in the news. If the Democratic
and Republican parties are in accord, the chance that opposing
views will receive enough visibility in the mass media to affect
public opinion is even more remote.2 In most cases, only when
elites are engaged in energetic public dispute will the content of
the news exhibit viewpoint diversity that the public is likely to
notice.2
It is true that government spokespersons and politicians may
take public stands in response to, or in anticipation of, likely pub-
" Reliance on government elites is documented in Leon V. Sigal, Reporters and Offi-
cials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking (D.C. Heath & Co., 1973); Gans, De-
ciding What's News (cited in note 11); Paletz & Entman, Media Power Politics (cited in
note 11); Hallin, Uncensored War (cited in note 17); W. Lance Bennett, Toward a Theory
of Press-State Relations in the United States, 40 J Commun 103 (Spring 1990). See also
John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge University Press, 1992);
Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989). Problematic ex-
ceptions are policy experts outside official government roles, and social movements. Without
going into detail, research suggests that neither of these sources gets very far in shaping
public discourse unless government officials take up their cause. See Todd Gitlin, The
Whole World is Watching (University of California Press, 1980); Robert M. Entman and
Andrew Rojecki, Freezing Out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the U.S. An-
tinuclear Movement, 11 Pol Commun 155-73 (1993).
" See Hallin, Uncensored War (cited in note 17); Entman, Democracy Without Citi-
zens (cited in note 4); Bennett, The Governing Crisis (cited in note 4); W. Lance Bennett,
Marginalizing the Majority: Conditioning Public Opinion to Accept Managerial Democ-
racy, in Michael Margolis and Gary Mauser, eds, Manipulating Public Opinion 321
(Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1989).
"4 See Hallin, Uncensored War (cited in note 17); Zaller, Mass Opinion (cited in note
22). See also Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and
Public Support (Stanford University Press, 1991).
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lic or media reactions, indicating that government itself is not au-
tonomous; there are reciprocal power flows among media, govern-
ment elites, and public. But research suggests that the greatest
source of power in the equation is that of government, and espe-
cially that of the executive branch.2 5 For our purposes, the key fact
is that government greatly influences news and commentary. The
notion of a large realm of autonomous media production and dis-
tribution of ideas fails to square with empirical research.2
When officials comment in harmony on an event or issue, the
media tend to mirror the dominant line. For example, research
comparing the coverage of two quite parallel civilian airliner trage-
dies, the Korean Airline Flight 007 attack in 1983 and the Iran Air
Flight 655 attack in 1988, illustrates this worst-case scenario for
media-assisted accountability.2 7 For both events, there was virtu-
ally no debate among the government elite, and media coverage
was thoroughly government scripted at the most overt and the
most subtle (yet powerful) levels. 28
Thus, for example, the covers of both Time and Newsweek fol-
lowing the Korean Airline tragedy illustrated a Soviet fighter plane
within a few hundred feet of the civilian airliner.29 In an uncon-
scious but effective way, these illustrations supported the Ameri-
can government's claim that the Soviets deliberately murdered 269
innocent men, women and children, as did the cover headlines:
"Murder in the Air" and "Shooting to Kill."8 0 Journalistic and
Congressional research later revealed that the Reagan administra-
tion knowingly misled the public and the press on Soviet inten-
tions and actions; in fact, the Soviets were unaware that the Ko-
rean plane was a civilian airliner.81 The important point for our
purposes is that a unanimous government elite.was able to control
25 See Entman, Democracy Without Citizens (cited in note 4); Jarol B. Manheim, All
of the People, All the Time: Strategic Communication and American Politics (M.E.
Sharpe, 1991); Maltese, Spin Control (cited in note 21); Robert M. Entman and Benjamin I.
Page, The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the Limits to Media Inde-
pendence, in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, eds, Taken by Storm: The Media,
Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War (University of Chicago Press,
1994).
26 See Entman, Democracy Without Citizens (cited in note 4).
" See Robert M. Entman, Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in
Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents, 41 J Commun 6 (Autumn 1991).
28 Id.
2" Time (Sept 12, 1983); Newsweek (Sept 12, 1983).
" Time (Sept 12, 1983); Newsweek (Sept 12, 1983).
81 See, for example, Seymour M. Hersh, "The Target is Destroyed": What Really Hap-
pened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It (Random House, 1986); Soviet Er-
ror Blamed for KAL Attack, Chicago Trib 1-3 (Jan 14, 1988).
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virtually every dimension of the information distributed in the
mass media-the choice of nouns, adverbs, and adjectives; the vis-
ual images; and the Cold War themes and symbols.
After the Iran Air incident, the unified elite was more or less
silent. Unlike its reaction to the Korean Airline affair, the press
offered little moral analysis or outrage when American forces shot
down a civilian airliner. In that case, the press went along with the
administration's and the Pentagon's insistence-unchallenged by
congressional elites-on total American innocence. Again, more re-
cent revelations suggest a different story.2 Nevertheless, journal-
ists at the time accepted the government's version of the events,
despite the lessons of Vietnam and, more recently, of the Korean
Airline story. These lessons suggest the need for deep skepticism of
an administration's claims about a confusing event, the interpreta-
tion of which the administration would obviously like to control.
While questions about the official American "line" in both
cases could be found in the press, public opinion polls suggest this
material went unnoticed by most people." Practically speaking,
the government controlled the coverage. Furthermore, the failure
of the media to question the administration line in both cases had
significant policy consequences. 3
Even where oppositional claims arise and attain some public-
ity, they often tend to be de-emphasized as compared to official
administration views. Despite the implications of much First
Amendment scholarship, good or true ideas have no inherent mo-
mentum that makes them more salient and believable to the mass
public; nor is there any force in the press or the journalistic pro-
cess that guarantees or even raises the probability that better ideas
will get wider and more prominent distribution than weaker ideas.
Research on the debate over American policy toward Iraq af-
ter its invasion of Kuwait reveals that even in a best-case scenario
in which government elites engage in strong public argument, the
administration enjoys a marked preference in the news coverage."
During the period immediately after President Bush announced
the doubling of the American troop commitment to the Middle
East, the most prominent reports in the New York Times and on
ABC's World News Tonight emphasized substantive support of
32 See Sea of Lies, Newsweek 28 (July 13, 1992).
" See Entman, Framing U.S. Coverage (cited in note 27).
3 See Hersh, The Target is Destroyed (cited in note 31); Entman, Framing U.S. Cov-
erage (cited in note 27).
85 See Entman & Page, The News Before the Storm (cited in note 25).
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the Bush administration by nearly a three-to-one ratio. 6 Assuming
that early coverage of an event is the most important phase of
public exposure because it frames audience reactions to all suc-
ceeding information, the widespread support of President Bush's
policy in the elite paper of record and on the most heavily watched
network was an important achievement for the Bush administra-
tion. Had oppositional viewpoints achieved a more balanced distri-
bution during this time, when the change to an offensive posture
was just becoming known, it is conceivable that media coverage of
the ensuing policy debate in Congress would have been more
informative.
Instead, the Bush administration dominated coverage of what
was arguably the most intense period of elite dissension regarding
the use of American military force since the Vietnam War. When
administration spokespersons such as President Bush, Vice Presi-
dent Dan Quayle, or Defense Secretary Richard Cheney made pub-
lic statements, they tended to receive extensive and prominent at-
tention in the press. When opponents, even well-known persons
such as two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, criticized
President Bush's policy during Senate hearings, they received only
brief attention that slighted their substantive arguments. While
editorial pages frequently called for vigorous public debate on the
looming Gulf War, actual news treatments seemed to discourage
the public from grasping and weighing the pro-war and pro-sanc-
tions sides equally. In the policy debate before the Gulf War, the
administration engaged in successful viewpoint discrimination if
not absolute censorship. During the Gulf War, the administration
did engage in censorship,3 7 and the First Amendment offered little
help. Meanwhile, discourse among government elites, including
congressional opponents and the administration, effectively pre-
vented the public from hearing of a third alternative to the admin-
istration-framed choice of sanctions versus war. Because no major
official from either party advocated the option of initiating negoti-
sO See id. The Washington Post was more critical during this period, but other media,
such as Time, were not. On balance, it seems fair to suppose that the bulk of media coverage
was either neutral or supportive of the administration. It would be impossible to list the
hundreds of articles on which this statement is based. The conclusion here comes from a
quantitative content analysis of all coverage of the Gulf War policy in these outlets from
November 8-16 and November 27-December 5, 1990. See id.
87 See John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf
War (Hill & Wang, 1992).
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ations with Saddam Hussein, that alternative was virtually invisi-
ble in the mass media and to the public. 8
How should we judge such performances in terms of democ-
racy? First Amendment scholarship focuses mostly on the produc-
tion of ideas, in the apparent belief that as long as freedom of pro-
duction is allowed, the free market will take care of distribution.
Yet democratic theory emphasizes the distribution and use of in-
formation. 9 The public must enjoy easy access to information to
have any hope of understanding its own interests and the way in
which the government impinges on them. Too many press observ-
ers assume that if the information is published once in a single
outlet, then it is genuinely visible to the entire public. In fact, how-
ever, one story appearing in a single outlet is unlikely to have any
impact on the political process.
A free and responsible press should habitually offer the mass
citizenry easy access to information that helps them hold govern-
ment accountable for its actions. A necessary condition for modern
American democracy, given the manner in which the political and
policymaking systems now operate, is the wide availability of infor-
mation that contextualizes and challenges the preferred positions
and the existing policies or actions of the incumbent administra-
tion. The information must be displayed prominently and repeat-
edly in the media on which most Americans rely: the network news
shows, the daily newspapers, and the weekly news magazines. Pos-
session of such information creates the potential for people to in-
fluence government in the three primary ways that now exist: by
registering opinions in surveys that may pressure government to
shape policy in a certain way; by joining political groups or move-
38 The editorial page of the New York Times did discuss the negotiation alternative,
but it never penetrated the news pages, where a demonization of Hussein and a focus on the
sanctions-versus-war options reigned. See Entman & Page, The News Before the Storm
(cited in note 25). This point takes no position on whether negotiation was in fact a wise
course. It was not considered an outlandish proposal in much of the European press, but the
key point for this article is that the absence of a position in the public utterances of govern-
ment elites created a vacuum in media content. This may be inevitable, even by some lights
desirable, given the limitations on the public's ability to evaluate every conceivable policy
solution. The influence of government over media content is much too complicated to probe
sufficiently here. See Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Media and American For-
eign Policy Since Vietnam (University of Chicago Press, 1994).
" See John A. Ferejohn and James H. Kuklinski, eds, Information and Democratic
Processes (University of Illinois Press, 1990); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The
Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (University of
Chicago Press, 1992); Zaller, Mass Opinion (cited in note 22); Dahl, Democracy and Its
Critics (cited in note 22); Entman, Democracy Without Citizens (cited in note 4).
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ments that bring organized pressure to bear; or by making more
informed choices at the ballot box.
Operationally, to achieve this goal, the news media would have
to offer balanced attention to competing views in all coverage, and
would have to self-consciously define their primary role to be edu-
cating citizens to participate in policy discourse. The latter would
yield an increase in information that is easily accessible, attractive,
and well organized for consumption. In this vision, anti-adminis-
tration information would be as simple to find and digest as pro-
administration information, and reforms in law, regulation, and
media practice would make balanced coverage their central aim.
Given the constraints on media practice documented in the litera-
ture, this would, in practical terms, provide ideas endorsed by
members of Congress and policy experts equal distribution with
the ideas of the administration. Such a goal would not prevent the
unity of coverage seen during the airliner tragedies, but it would
mean that a debate such as that over the Gulf War would receive
more even-handed and civically useful treatment.
To some observers, this goal might fall short; it accepts the
basic regime of informal government discrimination. While some
would argue the largest problem for democracy is the press's fail-
ure to transcend boundaries of conventional discourse among "re-
sponsible" elites, 0 it is quixotic as a practical matter to expect a
media industry itself dominated by establishment elites to go be-
yond those borders for news and opinion. Such straying by journal-
ists would not only antagonize the most powerful news sources, but
would also likely displease mass audiences who are themselves
steeped in conventional wisdom. Realistically, the national media
cannot widely disperse those views that transcend the ideas of im-
portant leaders in the Washington elite. Only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, such as those presented during the war in Vietnam, is
there much broadening of the discourse beyond official bounda-
ries.41 Even during Vietnam, the media were generally hostile to
the anti-war cause.' 2
40 See Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (St. Mar-
tin's Press, 2d ed 1992); Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent:
The Political Economy of the Mass Media (Pantheon Books, 1988).
"I See Gitlin, The Whole World (cited in note 22); Hallin, Uncensored War (cited in
note 17).
" Gitlin, The Whole World (cited in note 22).
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II. THE CHILLING EFFECT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Flaws in First Amendment analysis, and the absence of an em-
pirical understanding of the relationships just described, have an
important real-world impact on public policy towards the commu-
nications media, and thus affect how well the media serve demo-
cratic values. With government exerting so much informal power
over media content, the key question becomes how law and policy
might reduce that informal control, or otherwise enhance media
performance. Defining the problem in this way illuminates the pre-
cise goal that formal government policy intervention might seek: to
diminish media dependence on government elites and the concomi-
tant public dependence on information that is heavily shaped by
the very officials whom the public needs to hold accountable.
I suggest that the First Amendment has had a chilling effect
on discourse regarding communications policy, preventing analysts
from identifying this goal. The diversity, depth, and precision of
debate has been reduced by the enormous rhetorical power ana-
lysts can exercise by simply invoking the First Amendment."' The
position that has recently dominated deliberations at the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), and indeed most analytical
discourse, stresses that the primary meaning of the First Amend-
ment, and the best way to promote its values, is maximizing media
owners' rights to expression unimpeded by government. The now-
dominant view subsumes other interpretations of First Amend-
ment goals in its determination to shield owners from formal gov-
ernment intrusion. It holds that the government should encourage
competitive communication markets, because competition will
yield the optimum flow of diverse ideas-or at least it is more
likely to do so than any other regulatory scheme.
I believe that when government decisionmakers and judges in-
voke the First Amendment, they largely avoid the kind of careful
analysis of costs and benefits that is practiced in virtually every
other policy field in government. Leaving aside some important in-
consistencies and exceptions, such as national security and inde-
cency, policy and legal analysis has appeared to assume that any.
policy that might impinge on the autonomy of. news organizations
has infinite costs for which no benefits can be great enough. The
48 See Robert M. Entman and Steven S. Wildman, Reconciling Economic and Non-
Economic Perspectives on Media Policy: Transcending the "Marketplace of Ideas," 42 J
Commun 5 (Winter 1992). Parts of the current essay extend the argument in this article.




description applies best to the FCC of the Reagan and Bush ad-
ministrations, quite well to courts, and less well to Congress; cali-
brating these judgments is a task for future research. I focus here
on the FCC under Presidents Reagan and Bush, the locus of the
most important communications-policy decisions in recent years.
While President Clinton's appointees to the FCC could apply a
different or more diverse interpretation of the First Amendment,
the view identified here will remain highly influential. It has many
adherents among interest groups, scholars, and experts-and in
the judicial branch, where the previous administrations' judicial
appointees serve for life. The FCC's recent policy and legal dis-
course has barely hinted at the complexities highlighted by this
Symposium and by the writings of many legal scholars."
I formulated two hypotheses in a small pilot study to check for
an empirical basis to my suspicion that the First Amendment has
chilled analytical discourse in communications policy. The first hy-
pothesis is that when the FCC, between 1981 and 1992, used the
rhetoric of the First Amendment, it failed to refer to the many
conflicting interpretations of the First Amendment's meaning and
goals that are discernible in legal scholarship. Instead, the FCC
used the First Amendment narrowly and simplistically. The second
hypothesis is that during this period, the FCC ignored scholarly or
scientific evidence about how the media and their audiences actu-
ally behave. The mere mention of the First Amendment obviated
the need for reference to the empirical world and thereby chilled
analysis of communications policy.
To test my hypotheses, I conducted a content analysis of three
FCC rulings: the Fairness Doctrine,"5 the deregulation of radio, 6
and the consideration of children's television rules.' 7 These are
among the most far-reaching and controversial media deregulation
policies since 1980, and the FCC should therefore have been on its
" Good sources for this sort of complicated thinking include Cass R. Sunstein, Democ-
racy and the Problem of Free Speech (Free Press, 1993); Judith Lichtenberg, ed, Democ-
racy and the Mass Media (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First
Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (Harvard University Press, 1990); Frederick
Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1982); Bollin-
ger, Images of a Free Press (cited in nite 1). Note that the Clinton-era FCC might engage in
reasoning more influenced by such considerations.
" Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 2 FCC
Rec 17, 5272 (1987).
46 Deregulation of Radio, 84 FCC2d 968 (1981).
"7 Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, 96 FCC2d 634
(1984).
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best analytical behavior in justifying them. These rulings should be
a hard test for my claim. I counted and categorized all mentions in
these rulings of the First Amendment and of freedom of speech,
press, or expression, in an attempt to determine how the FCC has
employed these notions. Furthermore, I searched for all references
in these FCC rulings to scholarly writings.
I found that when the FCC invoked the First Amendment, it
almost exclusively referenced just two goals: (1) creating robust de-
bate in a diverse marketplace of ideas; and (2) protecting the free-
dom of media owners from governmental intrusion into editorial
decisionmaking. The following table demonstrates the results of
this analysis:
INVOCATIONS OF "FIRST AMENDMENT" OR "FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION, SPEECH, OR PRESS" IN FCC DECISIONS
ON THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, DEREGULATING RADIO,
AND CHILDREN'S TELEVISION4 8
Decision Ideas Referenced
Diverse Marketplace Editorial Autonomy Indefinite"
Fairness 14 34 17
Radio 2 4 1
Children's TV 0 8 1
Total 16 46 19
The above table reveals that the FCC espoused a relatively
consistent but narrow idea of the First Amendment's goals. Assum-
ing these rulings comprise a best-case, or at least a reasonable, test,
the FCC had in mind only those two goals whenever it mentioned
"free expression" or "the First Amendment." Furthermore, in
these three rulings, the FCC emphasized the goal of editorial au-
tonomy much more than the goal of achieving a diverse market-
place of ideas. Both of these goals are instrumental; that is, the
FCC did not reason in terms of final or end goals, a practice that
again distinguishes it from other regulatory agencies. Equally im-
portant, the more strongly emphasized aim of editorial autonomy
is the most clearly instrumental objective of the FCC's dual goals,
and is the most distant from the ultimate values protected by the
First Amendment.
48 This analysis includes the text of footnotes but excludes the dissenting statement of
Commissioner Rivera in Children's Television, 96 FCC2d at 634.
" In fifteen instances, the words were used without any contextual idea; in four cases,
the words referred to other ideas.
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The FCC's faith in these two instrumental goals, I believe,
blinded it to the need for careful analysis of how to reach final
ends such as those suggested by Professor Sunstein and the Hutch-
ins Commission. " Nor do I think that Congress or the courts have
done much better in recent years, although at this point, I must
limit my claim to the FCC. The FCC did not demonstrate in any
detail how the instrumental goals serve any final aims. Indeed, the
FCC did not mention ultimate objectives at all.
This brings me to my second hypothesis. Among the footnotes
to the rulings, numbering 328 altogether, just two offer (extremely
sketchy) references to scholarship discussing the manner in which
media organizations and audiences actually behave in idea produc-
tion or consumption." To talk about instrumental or ultimate
goals in an empirical rather than speculative way would require
reliance on the scholarly literature. Instead, the FCC virtually ig-
nored-at least in the published justifications for its deci-
sions-research evidence about behavior and how it might change
with a policy alteration.
In failing to look at empirical evidence, the FCC distinguishes
itself from other regulatory agencies that follow the Administrative
Procedures Act.2 Under the Administrative Procedures Act, other
regulatory agencies must weigh their final goals, or at least are sup-
posed to do so. For example, the EPA cannot implement a pollu-
tion regulation without empirically demonstrating a reasonable
likelihood that the policy will have a net positive effect on the en-
vironment." By contrast, citing to the First Amendment allows the
50 See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J
1.
6 Children's Television, 96 FCC2d at 649 n 36, cites a non-scholarly article by the head
of an interest group which in turn quotes an unnamed "Michigan State University study."
This note also references Television and Behavior: Ten Years of Scientific Progress and
Implications for the Eighties (National Institute of Mental Health, 1982).
Fairness Doctrine, 2 FCC Rec at 5300 n 86, cites an article by Bruce M. Owen, The
Role of Print in an Electronic Society, in Glen 0. Robinson, ed, Communications for To-
morrow: Policy Perspectives for the 1980's 229, 230 (Praeger Publishers, 1978). This note
quotes three sentences in the Owen article that assert that the role of print news editors is
to package ideas and reduce the burden of information processing on readers.
Two other footnotes mention scholarly studies concerning the marketing (not the pro-
duction or consumption) of ideas: Philip Kotler, Marketing Management: Analysis, Plan-
ning, and Control (Prentice Hall, 1976); Joseph R. Dominicle [sic, should be Dominick],
The Effects of Commercial Clutter on Radio News, 20 J of Broadcasting 169 (1976). See
also Deregulation of Radio, 84 FCC2d at 1004-05 n 71, n 75.
-2 5 USC §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988).
53 See, for example, Toxic Substances Control Act, 12 USC §§ 2605(a)-(c) (1988).
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FCC to get away with decisions that might otherwise be labelled
arbitrary and capricious.
The problem gets worse: this situation appears to be self-rein-
forcing. As suggested earlier, in the real commercial market, the
media do not create an information supply that resembles the met-
aphorical vision of a buzzing marketplace of ideas. In its absence,
consumers may not be educated to demand a diversity of informa-
tion that is independent or critical of government policy-the kind
of information supply envisioned in the marketplace-of-ideas met-
aphor and needed to fulfill democratic ideals.
Economists would call this an externality problem. Externali-
ties are the unintended effects of market exchanges. For my pur-
poses here, the most important externality-that is, the most im-
portant effect of market transactions in mass communications that
are not part of the intended bargain-is the impact of the commer-
cial market on civic interest and knowledge. The commercial mar-
ket underproduces news that enhances citizens' political interest,
knowledge, and sophistication, in large part because the commer-
cial pressure on suppliers is to attract the largest audience possi-
ble. The average audience member does not seek complex, sophis-
ticated information, and the mass media must target that average
member. Without a more socially-useful idea supply in the mass
media, consumers remain too uninformed to demand such a sup-
ply. The externality reinforces itself.
This again marks communications policy as a unique field. In
other areas, such as the environment or consumer safety, the exter-
nalities are not self-reinforcing; on the contrary, they tend to call
forth strong and sometimes overzealous political demands for cor-
rection. In communications, however, the externality has the effect
of suppressing both economic demand within the market and polit-
ical demand outside the market for solutions. Because of this
unique quality alone, communications policymakers ought to be
hyperconscious of the connection between and among policy in-
struments and final goals. Because of the chilling effect of the First
Amendment, I believe policymakers at the FCC have neglected to
make these connections. Indeed, the FCC seemed unaware that
when it intervened to reinforce the power of the commercial mar-
ket by deregulating broadcasters, it may have actually reinforced
the externality just described. In this sense, the FCC may have ac-
ted unwittingly to reduce demand for enhanced civic content in
the media.
As a specific example, the failure of the three major broadcast
networks to devote much coverage to the presidential nominating
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conventions in 1992 reflects the deregulatory mood at the FCC.
The FCC, having ceased to enforce the public-trustee concept of
licensing, could not conceivably threaten license renewal for
neglecting to cover the conventions gavel-to-gavel. Yet research
has shown that the conventions, when covered heavily, offer impor-
tant learning opportunities for a public not terribly interested in or
informed about politics.5 4 Absent that opportunity, their knowl-
edge may deteriorate further. Perhaps more important, the net-
works' decision to broadcast sitcoms and detective shows rather
than political conventions conveys a deeply cynical message about
the political process and its relevance to individual citizens' lives.
Hence the self-reinforcing phenomenon: the decrease in the pub-
lic's political interest and knowledge stemming from the failure to
cover political conventions might further reduce audience demand
and render it even less profitable for the networks to cover the
conventions and other important political events fully in the
future.
Among other worrisome effects, a less politically aware public
is less likely to realize how government policy has allowed, and
even encouraged, the major broadcast networks to reduce their
convention coverage, thus diminishing their political awareness
still further.5 5 Communications policy may therefore influence the
distribution of preferences in the political process, in this case, for
communications policy decisions themselves. Such indirect govern-
ment effects on the content of the public's demands upon the gov-
ernment appear no more compatible with First Amendment ideals
than direct intervention to promote or restrict ideas. These effects
lend further support to Professor Sunstein's half-truth analysis of
the defects in assuming that government cannot and does not en-
gage in viewpoint discrimination."
The identification of the possibility that communications pol-
icy indirectly and inadvertently shapes the distribution of ideas
suggests questions about the FCC's second instrumental goal, max-
imizing the freedom of media owners from government regulation.
The problem is that in practice, even when ostensibly acting to
free expression from constraints, as it did in Fairness Doctrine,
See Dean E. Alger, The Media and Politics 217 (Prentice Hall, 1989).
In 1992, political candidates used other formats for conveying political information,
such as talk-show appearances and "infomercials." Research has not yet established whether
the use of these vehicles significantly increased the public's political sophistication. Ratings
for these outlets, however, do suggest that millions of Americans demanded more than they
found in traditional newspaper and television news coverage.
See Sunstein, 1993 U Chi Legal F at 26-30 (cited in note 1).
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Deregulating Radio, and Children's Television, government may
actually be turning regulatory power over to the commercial mar-
ket. As another of Professor Sunstein's half-truths suggests, 57 this
means that deregulation might well be interventionist in its own
way: the policy of deregulation, by exposing media owners to the
full force of market competition and consumer demand, greatly af-
fects the ideas that broadcasters can practically choose to produce
and distribute if they want to stay in business. The idea of a com-
petitive market is precisely premised on the notion that consumer
demand constrains the options of suppliers. In other words, it may
be that by deregulating the media, the FCC does not prevent in-
trusion into the autonomy of the media, but instead merely
changes the mix of intruding forces.
Most analysts find it acceptable for the public to "vote"
through the economic market, and thus to limit and guide media
expression." If the market is efficient, this means minority tastes
will be served by marginal outlets. Unpopular ideas will be func-
tionally invisible to most of the public, which will be saturated by
the conventional and the popular. This situation is the predictable
result of market constraints on the expression of mass communica-
tion outlets. In this light, by deregulating broadcasting and substi-
tuting market pressures, government may not be acting in a genu-
inely content-neutral way.59 Yet most analysts now hold that it is
impermissible for the public to vote through representative govern-
ment institutions to affect media expression and ameliorate these
conditions.8 0 Is this because government has more resources than
the market to pressure and put a medium out of business or to
induce a change in management and its practices? Assuming the
current First Amendment regime, the answer is surely no; the mar-
ket can and does achieve that much more effectively.
Forces arising from the private market can pose as great a
threat to free expression as government. If energetic and diverse
public debate is the goal, then government regulation might be de-
57 See id at 34-35.
See Lichtenberg, ed, Democracy and the Mass Media (cited in note 44).
59 This is true unless one assumes a Rawlsian original position under which an endoge-
nous and natural distribution of ideas and preferences exists. That notion seems effectively
dispatched by Professor Sunstein, who points out that the existing press system relies upon
a set of prior government policy decisions regarding private property rights which them-
selves may have content-relevant implications. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of
Free Speech (cited in note 44).
60 The essays in Lichtenberg, ed, Democracy and the Mass Media (cited in note 44),
debate this proposition thoroughly. See especially Owen M. Fiss, Why the State? at 136-54;
Lee C. Bollinger, The Rationality of Public Regulation of the Media at 355-67.
[1993:
ENHANCING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
sirable in this context; intervention might even promote expression
by protecting the media from the full censorious powers of the
market. On the other hand, we will have to deal with the problem
cited by Ithiel Pool: in practice, broadcast regulation in the old
days never did enhance public debate very much. 1
If government really wanted to nurture speakers' ability to ex-
press diverse ideas and have them heard (that is, widely distrib-
uted), it would have to transcend conventional First Amendment
approaches. Forcing speakers to find private investment or charity
funds, and advertisers or paying customers to support the produc-
tion and distribution of their ideas, is not genuinely content-neu-
tral, if indeed such a thing is possible. Such a system restricts ex-
pressors' freedom to be heard and raises the costs to the
disengaged mass audience of finding more diverse and independent
views.
To be sure, the constraining force of the audience, its inter-
ests, capabilities, and prejudices, exists under any system of free
expression and information distribution. Moreover, the dangers of
political pressure from government agents are real. Yet analysts
should always weigh the risks of a policy against its likely benefits
and, in this case, against the market alternative under which eco-
nomic pressures are guaranteed to constrain the production and
distribution of ideas.
Additionally, this critique of the FCC's conventional First
Amendment wisdom leaves aside many other issues. For example,
the FCC's version of the First Amendment has neglected the role
and professional autonomy of journalists. Journalists have no First
Amendment expressive rights within their media organizations,
and that may have major impacts on the circulation of ideas. Re-
cent research62 suggests reasons to fear for reporters' and even
publishers' autonomy, with advertising revenues stagnating or
shrinking and news organizations being forced to become more re-
sponsive to advertiser complaints. Indeed, the implication of the
FCC's reasoning, which relied almost exclusively on media owners'
motivations and decisions to animate the "marketplace of ideas,"
is precisely that media owners constantly oversee and interfere
with the journalists who actually produce or disseminate ideas.
Otherwise, the FCC's reasoning would logically have to focus on
See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Belknap Press, 1983). See also
Henry Geller, Mass Communications Policy: Where We Are and Where We Should be Go-
ing, in Lichtenberg, ed, Democracy and the Mass Media at 290 (cited in note 44).
" C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U Pa L Rev 2097 (1992).
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other parties'-including journalists'-freedom in addition to that
of media owners.
This point brings me back to my basic theme. Despite the
complexities in the relationships of government policy to the pro-
duction and consumption of ideas, the main use of the First
Amendment in legal and policy analysis has been as an analytical
stopper, a chiller of discourse. If a proposed communications law
or policy seems to violate the First Amendment, little additional
investigation into its actual impact occurs. We need to root debates
over the First Amendment in the way that the media and audi-
ences actually behave, not in an abstracted ideal that neglects
what scholars and practitioners of journalism know about the real
world. Relatedly, we should strip the First Amendment of its sa-
cred status. We should treat it as a malleable embodiment of ideals
for the media's role in democracy rather than as a clear guide to
policy that has the single meaning of mandating minimal govern-
ment intervention in communications markets.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing analysis does not yield a recommendation for
traditional government regulation. The social-science understand-
ing of the news process cautions that we cannot compel audience
interest and attention to any mandated content. That is the key
problem with ignoring market forces. This conundrum is one that
those who favor traditional government intervention have not yet
dealt with satisfactorily, one that becomes more critical as commu-
nications outlets proliferate and grow more competitive. The fu-
ture will pose more difficulties for intervention, as the audience
will be scattered over many more media outlets. Already the cable
alternatives have reduced newspaper penetration and the ratings
of the network news. Audience fragmentation may limit the practi-
cal utility of traditional government regulations like the Fairness
Doctrine.
If traditional policies designed to affect content and distribu-
tion are less likely to be effective, arguably the most important pol-
icies to facilitate First Amendment or Hutchins Commission values
will be those that expand the telecommunications infrastructure to
ensure that no information gap develops between the rich and
poor. This means subsidizing citizens' access to the ever-increasing
information stores that are being produced and that will soon be
distributed not in traditional mass-media form, but on telecommu-
nications networks. With the very notion of a "mass medium" in
flux, we need to have a vigorous and unfettered discussion about
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ultimate democratic goals, one unchilled by the First Amendment.
Major transformations in the news industry provide all the more
reason to be clear on how journalism might contribute to the dem-
ocratic process.
In practice, we really do not want strict content-neutrality; we
want some discrimination in the distribution of information, if
only because government resources and, perhaps more important,
people's time and attention are scarce. The market is a good mech-
anism for content discrimination in distribution. Thus, a practical
scheme might adapt and expand upon Dean Bollinger's idea of a
mixed system6" and Professor Sunstein's ideas on a new deal for
free expression,64 wherein some media persist as profitmaking enti-
ties, some more regulated than others, and other news organiza-
tions receive public subsidies.
A mixed system should be keyed to the information media just
now emerging-information will probably be delivered by tele-
phone or cable companies accessed via a multimedia personal com-
puter offering a combination of video and text. If this is the infor-
mation network of the future, some form of "information stamps"
or vouchers analogous to food stamps might provide a way of com-
bining the best features of subsidies and markets. Government
might fund information production and its availability on the in-
formation network; distribution would be determined by consum-
ers themselves using, if necessary, their information vouchers.
Clearly, more thought is needed to prevent such a mechanism from
simply duplicating the outcomes of the existing market. And other
policy mechanisms also worth exploring can .be examined once we
free ourselves from the First Amendment's chilling effect on ana-
lyzing and achieving the ultimate goals of our democracy.
A newly free and diverse debate on how to realize First
Amendment goals might yield such other proposals as these:
- Subsidize newspapers so that they drop their politically potent
opposition in Congress to the telephone companies' provision of in-
formation in new and potentially democracy-enhancing forms.
Meanwhile, the subsidy might allow the newspapers to keep their
per-household circulation from shrinking.
- Subsidize the broadcast networks' practice of broadcasting the
party nominating conventions so that obligations to stockholders,
to maximize advertising revenues, will not force them to neglect an
"' See Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 Mich L Rev 1 (1976).
Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (cited in note 44).
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important opportunity to educate the public about presidential
candidates.
- Forbid the broadcast of short television political advertisements
or of poll results within one month of an election, so as to preserve
the widest ambit for autonomous public decisionmaking.
Such policies would not directly reduce the government's in-
formal power to shape the news. Nevertheless, they could accom-
plish a marginal improvement in the political sophistication of the
American citizenry. In turn, this heightened political awareness
might increase demand for higher quality civic information-and
for communications policies that make furthering the health of de-
mocracy a higher priority.
